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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: STILL
SEARCHING TODAY FOR A BETTER WAY
Joel M. Gora"
INTRODUCTION
I first encountered campaign finance reform as a young ACLU
lawyer twenty-five years ago, in 1972. Three old-time dissenters
came to the ACLU offices in New York with an incredible story.
In May of that year the group had run a two-page advertisement in
the New York Times advocating the impeachment of President
Richard Nixon for the bombing of Cambodia and praising those
few hardy-and clearly identified-Members of Congress who had
sponsored an Impeachment Resolution.' The advertisement was
turgid, wordy, legalistic and not very slick, but it embodied the
essence of what the First Amendment stands for: the right of
citizens to express their opinion about the conduct of their
government, free from fear of sanctions or reprisals from that
government. Nonetheless, before the ink on the advertisement was
barely dry, the federal government had hauled the group into
federal court.
How, we wondered, could this be possible? We were especially
mystified since this was a time, the Spring of 1972, when New
York imes Company v. Sullivan was protecting the most vigorous
citizen criticism of government officials against libel suits,2
" Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; co-counsel for challengers in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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See United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135,
1143-47 (2d Cir. 1972).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Brandenburg v. Ohio was protecting advocacy of violent revolution
against criminal punishment3 and, just the year before, The
Pentagon Papers case was protecting the press against prior
restraint on political speech. 4 What, in the face of these speech-
protective rulings, could justify Congress to pass a law that was
only slightly better than the Alien and Sedition Acts5 in terms of
stifling citizen criticism of government?
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE FLAWED WAY
We quickly learned the answer: the campaign finance "reforms"
that had just gone into effect one month earlier in April 1972, a
month before the advertisement appeared. Before the ink could dry
on the new Federal Election Campaigns Act ("FECA") of 1971,6
the Justice Department-Richard Nixon's Justice Department-used
the provisions of that new campaign reform law to haul the little
group into federal court.7 The government claimed that the
expenditure of funds on the advertisement was for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of the elections, thus rendering these
individuals a political committee. The government threatened them
with injunctions against further speech unless they complied with
the law, filed reports with the government and disclosed their
contributors and supporters.8 All of this was for simply sponsoring
an advertisement publicly criticizing the President of the United
States on a crucial issue of the day. We received an early wake-up
call to the severe dangers that campaign reform laws could pose to
political freedom and citizen issue advocacy, as well as some of the
ferocious First Amendment problems these laws could raise.
' 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
4 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
' 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (repealed 1801) (making it a crime to write, print, utter
or publish any false, scandalous and malicious writing against the United States
government).
6 Federal Election Campaigns Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1971)).
7 See United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135
(1972).
' See id. at 1137.
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We also received an example of how cumbersome and
contorted campaign funding restrictions could be. The 1971 law not
only was used to regulate the ad hoc protestors as a partisan
enterprise,9 but also required the group to provide certification"°
to the New York Times that the money spent on the advertise-
ment-which would be deemed in support of George McGovern,
Nixon's Democratic opponent-would not cause McGovern to
exceed the media expenditure limits that the new 1971 Act had put
on federal presidential candidates."1 Without McGovern's certifica-
tion, which he would never give because the costs of the advertise-
ment would diminish his own allowable media expenditures, it was
a criminal offense for the Times to charge for the group's advertise-
ment. Since the Times does not let people advertise in its pages free
of charge, this meant that it would not be run at all. This was a
neat little prior restraint. And all of this was the result of sponsor-
ing an advertisement in a newspaper, on a vital political issue of
the day, in a way that the government claimed was for the purpose
of influencing the outcome of the election of President Nixon, who
had been criticized, and of the several Members of Congress who
had been praised.
Because of this interpretation, the ACLU had to file its own
lawsuit" in order to secure its right to sponsor advertisements
critical of President Nixon's handling of certain public issues
during the election season without being subjected to the campaign
9 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) defines "political committee" as "any committee,
club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions... or
which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar
year." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) defines "expenditure" as "any purchase payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made
by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." If
an organization meets the definition of a "political committee," then under 2
U.S.C. § 434 the organization is required to file reports of receipts of expendi-
tures, and the names of contributions and recipient candidates.
10 47 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1970 & Supp. III 1973) (repealed 1974).
" Id. The same certification would be required of the several members of
Congress whom the advertisement supported.
1 See American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041,
1058 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated sub. nom., Staats v. American Civil Liberties
Union, Inc., 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
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finance laws.' 3 The certification requirement provision was
quickly struck down as the prior restraint it was 4 and the courts
ruled that campaign laws could only be used against federal
candidates and their political committees. The courts confidently
assured issue-oriented organizations that they could continue to
engage in public issue advocacy free from government restraint and
that we could all breath a sigh of relief. 5 Right.
Within a year, we had the Watergate hearings and revelations
of excessive campaign funding particularly by the Nixon Re-
Election Committee. It should be remembered that almost all of
those campaign funding practices occurred before the new disclo-
sure provisions of the 1971 Act went into effect in April 1972.
13 Id. at 1042-45 (setting forth factual background of the case). A copy of
the advertisement is provided in the opinion's appendix.
14 Id. at 1054.
1" See United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d
Cir. 1972); Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041. Both the National Committee for
Impeachment court and the Jennings court unanimously condemned the use of
campaign finance controls against issue advocacy groups and discussion. The
Jennings court confidently observed that "groups concerned with the open
discourse of views on prominent national issues may... comfortably continue
to exercise these rights and feel secure that by so doing their associational rights
will not be encroached upon." Jennings, 366 F. Supp. at 1057.
Despite these specific assurances, when Congress wrote the major reforms
that would give rise to the Buckley litigation, Congress included a special
separate provision precisely designed to regulate issue-oriented groups that
published voter guides and "box score" information about incumbent office-
holders up for reelection. See 2 U.S.C. § 437a (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed
1976).
That section was challenged as part of the litigation in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, a court which upheld every other provision of the new law,
unanimously struck down that section as an unconstitutional regulation of non-
partisan issue discussions, even of campaign issues and candidate voting records,
which, though they might influence the outcome of elections, are "vital and
indispensable to a free society and an informed electorate." Buckley v. Valeo,
519 F.2d 821, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975). That ruling was never appealed and the
section was allowed to die. It is ironic that this constitutionally failed and
flawed provision is very similar to ones currently being proposed in Congress.
See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. Plus Va change, plus Va la meme
chose.
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Such questionable funding practices would have been the subject
of complete disclosure thereafter. However, the new disclosure
reforms were not given even one full election cycle to be tested
before Congress was stampeded into enacting the sweeping 1974
restrictions on political activity that would give rise to the
Buckley 6 litigation.
The 1974 Act was the mothership of government control of
political funding and, therefore, of political speech. As Judge Ralph
Winter and others have discussed, the 1974 law swept across the
landscape of federal political activity and communication, severely
restricting candidates, campaigns, contributors, independent political
groups and even non-partisan issue-oriented groups like the ACLU,
which had just been assured that their advocacy would be free of
official restraint.1 7 Enforcement of the new restrictions was placed
in the hands of a commission totally controlled by the House and
Senate'--a cynical breach of separation of powers that the
Buckley Court would unanimously declare unconstitutional. 19
The Act severely restricted a candidate's overall campaign
expenditures 20 and thereby, campaign speech, even if the candi-
date's funding all came from small contributors, as was true for
candidates like Ramsey Clark.2' The Act severely limited the
amount of money candidates were allowed to contribute to their
22own campaigns, even though candidates could not possibly
16 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'7 See Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L.
& POL'Y 93 (1997).
"8 See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (amended 1976).
19 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140 (holding that the Appointments Clause bars
Congress from appointing members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
because the FEC has primary responsibility for law enforcement and such powers
have been delegated only to the Executive Branch by Article II, Sections 2 and
3 of the Constitution. The Court held that, accordingly, the members of the
Commission had to be selected through normal constitutional processes of
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate).
2" See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(A)-(B) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
21 In his 1974 Senate campaign, Ramsey Clark, a former Attorney General,
"relied entirely on contributions of $100 or less." Brief for Appellants 134,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437).
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1).
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corrupt themselves. Ross Perot's funding of his $60 million
Presidential campaign in 1992, which arguably changed the face of
national politics for the 1990s, would have been a federal crime. So
too would Steve Forbes' $30 million 1996 Republican primary
campaign, which put the balanced budget issues on the front
burners. Both campaigns raised vital issues and played important
roles on our national scene, yet both would have been throttled and
killed by the 1974 reforms. Had those two men used their money
to run for the White House under those laws, they would have
ended up in the Big House.
The new law, which placed a ceiling of $1,000 on independent
expenditures by any person during a campaign, effectively silenced
independent speakers in an unprecedented fashion.23 The ceiling
was about equal to the cost of a one-quarter page advertisement in
the New York Times, relative to a clearly identified federal
candidate. Spend a dime more to express your political opinion and
go to jail.24 Such an unprecedented restraint of independent citizen
speech, the core of the First Amendment, was justified by reform-
ers as a loophole closing device to ensure that contributors, limited
to giving $1,000 directly to any candidate,25 would not evade that
limit by sponsoring a political advertisement in a newspaper.
Contributors of over $100 would have their names publicly
disclosed26 and those who gave as little as ten or fifteen dollars
would have their names kept on file for possible later reporting to
the government.27 Additionally, all of those pesky non-partisan,
issue-oriented groups that reported and commented on the legisla-
tive and public records of incumbents would likewise have to file
reports with the government disclosing their contributors and
23 Id. § 608(e)(1).
24 See id. § 608(i).
25 Id. § 608(b)(1) (1970 Supp. IV 1974) (amended by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)
(1994)).
26 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (requiring that the
contributor's name, address, occupation and principal place of business were to
be included in reports filed by the political committee); id. § 438(a)(4) (requiring
that the political committee report be made available for public inspection).
27 Id. § 432(c)(2) (amended 1980) (requiring that the treasurer of a political
committee record the name, amount and date of any contribution over $10).
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supporters.28 All of this was to be monitored and enforced by a
Commission handpicked by the leaders of the House and Senate.29
Finally; while the law provided for public funding of Presiden-
tial campaigns, the receipt of the funding came with extensive
strings attached, and the formula for allocating the funding all but
excluded minor and third party candidates from eligibility for the
subsidies.3 °
As breathtaking as the law was in terms of the political
communication and activity it sought to control, it was no less
cynical in what it exempted from those campaign funding controls
and limitations. The most outrageous exemption was for the costs
of the frank,31 which by itself, gave incumbent House Members
more money to spend on political communication with their
constituents than the amount a challenger could spend on his or her
entire campaign.32 So much for a level playing field.
Likewise, all of the expenses and perquisites of office that
facilitate political and constituent communication, paid for by the
public but benefitting incumbents as candidates, were also not
counted against their spending limits. 33 All of the facilities and
amenities of the House and the Senate that can be used to woo
voters and supporters were not counted. The same holds true for
the use of the White House and the Lincoln Bedroom.
In-house communications by corporations and labor unions,
even with the most partisan content, were excluded from restric-
tion.34 So too were the corporate and union treasury expenses
used to set up corporate and union political action committees
28 See id. § 437a (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). This was the
provision invalidated by the Circuit Court in Buckley. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
29 Id. § 437c(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (am'ended 1976).
'o 26 U.S.C. § 9003(c) (1970 & Supp. III 1973).
3' 39 U.S.C. § 3216 (1994). The congressional "frank" is the privilege that
allows members of Congress to mail newsletters to their constituents, sponsored
by taxpayer funds.
32 Brief for Appellants 101, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-
436 & 75-437).
33 Id. at 101-04.
34 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1976).
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("PACs"),35 which were legitimized by the 1974 Act.36 In-kind
contributions of skills and talents, regardless of their market value,
were free from regulation; but persons who could not spare the
time but could spare the dime, were severely limited in how much
money they could contribute.37 Finally, the press was statutorily,
and appropriately, left totally free to editorialize and report on
candidates and campaigns without any limitations or controls, 38
even though the press can have an enormous influence on the
outcome of any election.
We in the ACLU at the time said that these were not real
reforms. The reforms were a fraud, if not also an Incumbents
Protection Act. They were an unprecedented, unconstitutional,
unworkable and an unwise assault on political freedom in America.
They would stifle and suppress individual and group advocacy
pertaining to politics and government-the political expression at
the core of the electoral process and of First Amendment freedoms;
the very engine of democracy. Additionally, they would not secure
equality of political opportunity because only some, but not all,
political resources were controlled by the law. Wealthy groups and
individuals, barred by the law from making unlimited contributions
and expenditures,39 would undoubtedly find other ways to bring
their resources to bear on politics. But insurgent or new voices
would be stilled by the deadening new limits on their few wealthy
supporters and intrusive disclosure of even their most modest
contributors. Ultimately, the laws would magnify the power of
incumbency, increase the power of PACs and still not drive the fat
cats from the political temple. Moreover, the logic of restricting
35 PACs are political action committees defined as "any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." Id. § 431(4)(a).
36 Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C).
31 Compare id. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (limiting contributions from individuals to
$1,000), with 18 U.S.C. §591(e)(5)(A) (excluding from contributions the value
of services provided without compensation by individuals who volunteer a
portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or political committee).
" 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i).
31 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1).
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candidates' contributions and expenditures would inevitably evolve
into attempts to control all sources of political speech that might
influence the outcome of an election. Finally, letting government
monitor and inspect campaign speech and political association in
order to enforce all these restrictions would be a treacherous
prospect for the First Amendment.
In short, the FECA's limits-based approaches to campaign
finance problems were unconstitutional, unwise and unworkable.
Limits are unconstitutional because they cut to the heart of the
First Amendment's protection of political freedom. The very
essence of the First Amendment is the right of the people to speak,
to discuss, to publish, to organize and to join together with others
on issues of political and public concern. Yet the FECA provisions
at issue in the Buckley case imposed sweeping and Draconian
restraints on the abilities of citizens, groups, candidates, commit-
tees, parties and partisans to use their resources in order to make
political contributions and expenditures to support and embody
their freedom of speech and association.
Limits are unwise because they make it harder for challengers,
insurgents and new voices to raise funds to participate in politics,
while enabling more established individuals and groups to find
numerous ways to circumvent the limits. Limits on giving and
spending make it harder for those subject to the restraints to raise
funds and easier for those outside the restraints to bring their
resources to bear on politics. Limiting individual contributions to
$1,000 per candidate while allowing PACs to contribute $5,000,
makes it more difficult to raise money from individuals, thus
making candidates more dependent on PACs and other organized
sources of support. In Buckley, we contended that the FECA,
enacted by Congress, approved by the President and enforced by
the Federal Election Commission, beholden to both, was designed
to restrain the speech and association of those who would criticize,
challenge or oppose the elected establishment.
Limits are unworkable because groups and individuals will find
other means by which to influence the political process with their
resources. PACs, soft money and issue advocacy are all the direct
result of campaign finance controls and limitations. It is commonly
known that in Buckley the Court struck down limitations on
expenditures, but upheld limits on contributions. As a result, with
145
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overall spending limits voided as violative of the core of the First
Amendment; with limits on how much wealthy candidates could
spend on their own campaigns voided; with independent campaign
committees, issues groups and the press free to use their resources
to comment on candidates and causes without limit; with less well-
heeled candidates sharply restricted in their ability to raise money
from family, friends and other contributors-the stage was set for
a two-decade period dominated by the advantages of incumbency,
the rise of PACs, the increasing use of soft money and the growing
activity of issue advocacy groups.
The rise of these factors demonstrates that our prediction
twenty years ago was correct; the approach of limits on contribu-
tions and expenditures simply will not work. Limit the funding of
the candidates equally, and the advantage of incumbency or
celebrity will disturb the equilibrium. So too will the presence of
powerful outside voices, independent political groups, labor unions,
issue groups and the news media alter the balance. Limit wealthy
contributors from giving money to candidates and they will still be
able to buy newspapers, fund issue groups and give large amounts
of soft money to voice their message to an extent far beyond the
reach of the average person. Attempt to limit all the methods of
influencing the electorate, claiming that wealthy contributors are
buying influence, drowning out the voice of the people or prevent-
ing a level playing field, and you have a First Amendment
meltdown. It is far better to deal with such disparities by providing
floors to support political activity rather than constructing ceilings
to restrict it.
The last twenty years have shown how right we were. The
proposals on the front legislative burner today,40 tired retreads of
the same flawed approaches, unfortunately show how little we have
learned.
" Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997).
For an excellent analysis of how such limits-based approaches are fundamentally
flawed under First Amendment principles, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663 (1997).
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II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: BUCKLEY'S WAY
In Buckley, the Court invalidated the limits on expenditures, but
upheld the restraints on contributions.4' Much of what the Court
said still resonates today.
A. Protecting Speech
Responding to the argument that money is not speech, the
Court quite sensibly reasoned that limitations on how much you
could spend to speak were limitations on how much you could
speak. The concept that withholding or restricting the funding for
speech is tantamount to restricting that speech has since been
heartily reaffirmed by the Court in a number of free speech
settings. The Court has struck down a ban on paying people to
collect signatures on election petitions,42 overturned the Son of
Sam statutory ban on receiving money to write about your
crime,43 and invalidated the federal ban on employees receiving
pay for moonlighting speeches.44 Those of us who have argued,
successfully or not, that speech-based restraints on arts funding,45
abortion counseling funding 46 or legal services litigation fund-
ing47 were restraints on the speech so penalized, appreciate the
inexorable and inextricable link between restrictions on funding and
restrictions on speech. Moreover, these latter cases involved
restrictions on the use of government funds, while the FECA
4' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
43 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991).
44 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454
(1995).
45 Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 112 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.
1997).
46 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
47 Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v. Legal Services Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402
(D. Haw. 1997); Varshavsky v. Geller, Index No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
12/24/26).
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involved restrictions on the use of private funds by individuals and
groups.
In response to the claim, relentlessly repeated today, that
campaign spending has skyrocketed and should be legislatively
restrained, the Court stated that the First Amendment denied
government the power to make that determination: "In the free
society ordained by our Constitution, it is not the government but
the people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively
as associations and political committees-who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political
campaign. 48 Essentially, as Justice Harlan stated in his classic
First Amendment opinion, Cohen v. California, "that the air may
at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is ... not a sign of
weakness but of strength. 49
To the claim that the free speech of those with more resources
should be restrained in order to enhance the political opportunity
of those with less resources, the Court responded:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed "to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources," and "to assure unfettered exchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and societal
changes desired by the people. 50
Seeking equality of political opportunity and influence through
limitation of political speech is a fool's errand. Limit the funding
of the candidates equally and the advantage of incumbency or
celebrity will disturb the equilibrium, as will the presence of
powerful outside voices such as independent political groups, labor
unions, issue groups and the news media. Limit wealthy contribu-
tors from giving money to candidates and they will still be able to
buy newspapers, fund issue groups and give large amounts of soft
4' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
41 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
50 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
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money to get their message out in ways that the average person
cannot equal. Attempt to limit all those voices and methods of
influencing the electorate, on the claim that they are buying
elections or drowning out the voice of the average person, and you
do incalculable harm to the First Amendment.
Nor are these futile efforts at equalizing voices justified by
reference to the special or parliamentary nature of elections.
Elections are special, even sacred, in terms of democratic participa-
tion. But they are no less special or sacred for free speech
concerns. Candidacies and campaigns are the primary vehicles for
giving voice to popular grievances, raising issues and proposing
solutions. An election is the time when political speech must be at
its most robust and unfettered. As the Court recognized in a ballot
access election case, electoral speech and activity "are at the core
of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms. ' 5 1
Nor should we accept the notion that becoming a political
candidate can be conditioned on sacrificing some of one's political
speech; the price of a place on the ballot is not to be the forfeiture
of one's right to speak.
By the same token, the principle of one person/one vote52
ensures that the votes of all voters will be counted equally, not that
the speech all citizens can be restricted equally. It costs us virtually
nothing to eliminate financial barriers to voting and absolutely
nothing to guarantee that each person's vote will be given equal
weight. It costs us dearly, however, to restrict the right of one
person to speak, on the basis that those who cannot afford such
speech will thus have some sense of equal political opportunity.
The principle that guarantees each citizen will be given only one
ballot, without charge, at the polling booth does not justify a rule
which insists that no person can print more than ten leaflets to
hand out outside. The equality concern pertaining to one person/one
vote should not be transformed into a levelling free speech
principle of one person/one paragraph. If some voters cannot afford
transportation to the polls, for example, the enlightened democratic
solution is to provide them with a ride, not to make everyone else
51 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (emphasis added).
52 See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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walk. We should address problems of disparities of wealth by
subsidizing the have-nots, rather than restricting the haves. Free
speech should certainly be no exception to this instinct. We will
not strengthen democracy by restricting speech. The principle of
one person/one vote is a rule for the ballot box, not for the soap
box.
Finally, if "money talks," it talks all year long and not just on
election day. Why only control funding during the campaign? What
about the millions of dollars spent by powerful lobbying interests
throughout the year? The National Rifle Association often spends
far more money on direct mail and grass-roots lobbying to defeat
gun control legislation than it contributes to Congressional
candidates. Common Cause is consistently among the big spenders
of lobbying organizations. Why should the wealthy supporters of
those organizations have a greater financial ability to influence
legislative outcomes than the average person? It seems that if one
accepts the undue influence/equal political opportunity theory, then
it is only prudence, not principle, which separates political
candidates and their supporters, on one hand, from the media,
lobbying groups, organizations and wealthy individual advocates on
the other.
Finally, responding to the claim that a large range of political
discussion could be restrained because it might influence the
outcome of elections, the Court ruled that only those communica-
tions which contain explicit words of advocacy of election or
defeat of a candidate, i.e. words which in express terms advocate
the election of a clearly identified candidate,53 could even be
subject to the milder regulatory restraint of disclosure. Moreover,
all speech which does not expressly advocate such a result is
totally free of any permissible regulation: "[s]o long as persons and
groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to
spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views."54
53 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
54 Id. at 45. The Court also approved limiting the reach of the Act to groups
whose "major purpose" is partisan advocacy. See id. at 79. The precise nature
of that "major purpose" limitation on the FECA is currently pending before the
Court in FEC v. Akins, 101 F.3d 731, (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
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B. Restricting Speech
Unfortunately, the Court did not go far enough in protecting
political funding, and it upheld limits on contributions either made
to candidates or to committees that contribute to candidates.1 It
did so because of the concern with quid pro quo corruption, the
appearance of corruption and the assumption that effective
disclosure of large contributions would not be a sufficient demo-
cratic antidote.16 That set the stage for the frustration and dispari-
ties of the last twenty years.
Severe contribution limits make it harder for challengers to
raise money, which is why the overall disparity between incumbent
and challenger spending is twice what it was before the reforms.
This disparity is widened because incumbents receive the perqui-
sites of office and free means of communication, while challengers
have to raise hard dollars with severe contribution limits in place.
The disparity between contributions and expenditures means
Steve Forbes can spend $30 million of his own fortune on his own
campaign, but cannot write a check for that amount-subject to full
disclosure and the political consequences that may follow-to Jack
Kemp who might have been better able to campaign to communi-
cate the same message.
The distinction between express advocacy and all other issue-
focused political speech, constitutionally compelled in order to keep
campaign finance regulations from overwhelming public issue
discussion in America, has produced twenty years of relentless,
disruptive and harassing Federal Election Commission attempts to
investigate and prosecute issue and legislative advocacy groups
ranging from the National Right to Life Committee" to the
National Organization for Women. 8
2451 (1997) (96-1590).
15 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
56 Id. at 24-29.
17 See Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309 (1st Cir. 1997).
51 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp.
428 (D.D.C. 1989).
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The disparity between hard money and soft money means that
wealthy party contributors, able to make only limited candidate-
focused contributions, can give unlimited amounts to the party of
their choice for party-building activities, voter registration and get-
out-the vote drives. 59 The soft money "scandal" did not emerge
full-blown in 1996, though many act as though it did. Elizabeth
Drew wrote about it in 1984.60 It was the direct and expected
result of the campaign law's severe controls on contributions to
presidential and other federal candidates.
The disparity between powerful media owners and all other
political speakers results in a situation where the press can
expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate it so
chooses, day after day, on its editorial pages and can give favorable
coverage to any candidate it wants, day after day, on its front
pages.6 ' But those supporters of the disfavored candidate cannot
contribute significant funds to enable that candidate to respond.6 z
Additionally, the disparity between corporate media entities and
other corporate entities is such that an editorial endorsement of a
candidate on page 26 is free speech,63 but the same words spon-
59 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii) (1997) (excluding from contributions the
payment of a political party's costs for voter registration and get-out-the-vote
activities that would be conducted on behalf of nominees of such party for
President and Vice President).
6 See ELIZABETH DREw, POLITICS AND MONEY (1984). Ray Kroc, the
founder of McDonald's was one of the Nixon "fat cats" who gave $250,000 to
The Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP) before the FECA was passed
and whose contributions helped prompt the campaign finance controls at issue
in Buckley. A decade later, his widow, Joan Kroc, gave $1 million-four times
her husband's contribution-to the Democratic National Committee and was
lavishly praised for her party loyalty. Another cause for the enactment of the
FECA was the so-called "selling of ambassadorships" by the Nixon Administra-
tion. Under President Clinton, the two most recent ambassadors to France, the
late Pamela Harriman, and the Wall Street banker, Felix Rohatyn, were major
contributors to the Democratic Party.
Once again, plus Va change, plus Va la meme chose.
61 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(viii)(l).
62 See id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
63 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i).
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sored by a corporate entity in an advertisement on page 25 is a
felony.64
Likewise, for example, if in the New York mayoral election,
Rupert Murdoch essentially turns over his news and editorial pages
to the campaign of incumbent Rudy Guiliani, the law protects his
right to do so. But if George Soros wants to give challenger Ruth
Messinger enough funding to run billboard advertisements to
counter the Murdoch-Guiliani message, the law treats this effort as
an illegal and prohibited campaign contribution. Where is the level
playing field in that? Why can Rupert Murdoch "drown out" Ruth
Messinger, but George Soros is not permitted to help her out.
Freedom of the press, as A.J. Liebling once observed, may belong
to those who own one, but our campaign finance laws, however,
should not be predicated on such distinctions. People should be free
to support the candidate of their choice, whether they write an
editorial or a check.65
How much longer will our First Amendment system of freedom
of expression continue to make these content-based, speaker-based
distinctions where the core of the First Amendment is concerned?
Buckley went a long and necessary way toward protecting a great
deal of political communication by invalidating restraints on
expenditures. But the Court's upholding of limitations on contribu-
tions and the other statutory and constitutional distinctions have
produced a crazy-quilt regime. Hard money/soft money, express
advocacy/issue advocacy, contributions/expenditures, media
speakers/other speakers-these distinctions, although often critical
to maximizing protection of political speech, have caused serious
problems. What we need instead is a unitary approach, doctrinally
and legislatively, that will protect and expand the funding of
political speech and activity, not restrict and control it. And,
indeed, some are starting to propose the more far-reaching public
and private financing of campaigns that may truly open the doors
of political opportunity.
64 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
6S See Arthur Eisenberg's thought-provoking article, Buckley, Rupert
Murdoch and the Pursuit of Equality in the Conduct of Elections, (forthcoming
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE). One might add Arthur Sulzberger or
Katherine Graham or Ted Turner, as well.
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III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE FAILED WAY
Such positive policy is not Washington's way. Unfortunately,
the major campaign finance reform bill in Washington this season,
favored by President Clinton, supported by the media establishment
and clamored for by the same people who rallied the last round of
great reforms, was about limits, limits and more limits. The
proposed reforms were contained in the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 1997, known as the McCain-Feingold bill
("Senate Bill 25").66 Some limits are imposed directly upon
candidates, parties and independent groups.67 PAC contributions
would be outlawed, 68 even though they are both the embodiment
of freedom of speech and often facilitate insurgent candidacies
from women, minorities, gays and lesbians and other underrepre-
sented constituencies. Soft money would be severely restricted,69
even though it strengthens political parties, vital to democracy.
Independent political groups would be disrupted by burdensome
rules seeking to ferret out coordination70 with candidates, instan-
66 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong.
§§ 101-504 (1997).
61 See id. §§ 101, 105, 211.
61 Id. § 201.
69 Id. § 211 (proposing that a political party "shall not solicit or receive any
contributions, donations, or transfers of funds, or spend any funds, that are not
subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements" imposed on
contributions to federal candidates. In addition, section 211 proposes that any
amount spent by a political party that may affect the outcome of a federal
election, including any voter registration or get-out-the-vote activity, any generic
campaign activity and any communication that refers to a candidate, shall be
made from funds subject to limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements).
" Id. § 405 (stating that a coordinated expenditure would include "a
payment made for a communication or anything of value that is for the purpose
of influencing an election ... [and] in coordination with a candidate." The
phrase "coordination with a candidate" includes "a payment made by a person
in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, at the request or suggestion of, or
pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a candidate . . . ." In
addition, a coordinated expenditure would include "a payment made by a person
for the dissemination, distribution, or republication, in whole or in part, of any
broadcast or any written, graphic, or other form of campaign material prepared
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taneous disclosure and record-keeping.7' Issue groups are threat-
ened by grossly expanded definitions of express advocacy.
72
Public subsidies are dangled but with restrictive and coercive
conditions upon their availability. A candidate wants free television
time? The candidate can just sign up for limits on the overall
campaign expenditures and on the use of the candidate's own funds
for the campaign.73 A candidate wants reduced postal rates? The
candidate need only agree not to get contributions from supporters
in other states,74 even though they might share a common
cause.75 Additionally, the bill contains a ban on political contribu-
tions by persons not eligible to vote, i.e. lawful permanent resident
aliens who are not citizens,76 which is an insult to the First
Amendment guarantees of free speech to all within our shores. The
bill reduces the recordkeeping threshold for contributions and
disbursements from $200 to $50,77 or for eligible candidates, to
as low as $20;78 this constitutes a gross invasion of political
privacy.
All of these new and restrictive rules governing political speech
and association would be enforced by giving expanded enforcement
powers to the Federal Election Commission. The fact that, in the
midst of a campaign the Commission could go to court to enjoin
by a candidate").
71 See id. § 304.
72 See id. § 406 (Express advocacy is defined by the bill as "a communica-
tion that conveys a message that advocates the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office." In addition, express advocacy will
include advertising costing more than $10,000 "that refers to a clearly identified
candidate, that a reasonable person would understand as advocating the election
or defeat of a candidate").
73 See id. § 102.
74 See id. §§ 101, 104. Section 101 provides that in order for an "eligible
Senate candidate" to take advantage of the reduced postal rates under §104, at
least 60% of the total amount of contributions accepted must be from individuals
who are legal residents of the candidate's state.
15 At this writing, the McCain-Feingold bill has been "trimmed down" to
focus on proposed restrictions on issue advocacy and soft money.
76 Id. at § 306.
71 Id. § 304.
71 Id. § 101.
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a violation of the Act,79 poses an ominous and sweeping threat of
prior restraint and political censorship.
This bill is fatally and fundamentally flawed when measured
against First Amendment values and standards. The provisions of
Senate Bill 25 that seek to induce candidates to adhere to spending
limits and penalize those who refuse, and severely restrict political
action committees and restrain contributions to political parties are
not justified by Buckley or later cases. 80 The provisions of the bill
which assault independent political activity and invade the
absolutely protected sphere of issue speech are specifically
condemned by Buckley and its progeny as all but per se invalid.
The entire sweep of the bill, including the greatly expanded
enforcement powers given to the Federal Election Commission,8'
is worse than the sum of its parts. In many respects, it seems as
objectionable an assault on political freedom as were the provisions
of the Federal Election Campaigns Act at issue in Buckley.
82
A. Voluntary Spending Limits
Title I of the bill, providing spending limits and benefits for
Senate campaigns,83 is an attempt to coerce what the law cannot
directly command; it is a backdoor effort to impose campaign
spending limits-which almost always benefit incumbents-in
'9 Id. § 303.
80 The Court's most recent pronouncement on the core meaning of Buckley
v. Valeo came in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm'n., 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996). The Court held that a political party's
expenditures for radio advertisements that attacked the opposing party's candidate
were "independent expenditures" since the advertisements' scripts were
developed without consultation with any of the party's three nominees. 116 S.
Ct. at 2315-17. Therefore, these expenditures could not be regulated under 2
U.S.C. § 441a(d). In so holding, the Court rejected the government's argument
that all party expenditures should be treated as if they had been coordinated as
a matter of law. Id. at 2318. In addition, the Court also rejected the government's
argument that a political party's expenditure is coordinated with a candidate's
campaign because the party and the candidate are identical. Id. at 2319.
"' See S. 25 § 301-308.
82 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1971).
83 S. 25 § 101.
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violation of essential free speech principles and the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. The provisions regarding "voluntary"
expenditure limits and other campaign funding controls, 4 imposed
to induce candidates to accept ceilings and restrictions on political
speech and penalize and disadvantage those who will not do so,
raise serious First Amendment problems. The receipt of public
subsidies or benefits should never be conditioned on surrendering
First Amendment rights. Such a situation penalizes the exercise of
those rights. 5 Since candidates have an unqualified right to spend
as much as they can to get their message to the voters, to spend as
much of their own funds as they can and to raise funds from
supporters all over the country, they cannot be made to surrender
those rights in order to receive public benefits.
In Buckley the Court observed that Congress might establish a
system where candidates would choose freely and voluntarily
between public funding with expenditure limits and private
spending without limits, where the non-participating candidate
remained free to engage in unlimited private funding and spend-
ing. 6 In that setting, the purpose of public financing of Presiden-
tial campaigns was not to abridge, restrict or censor speech, but
rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discus-
sion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-
governing people.8 7
Senate Bill 25 fails this test, for both its overall purpose and
effect are to limit speech, not enhance it. The bill imposes
substantial penalties on those disfavored, non-complying candidates
who will not agree to limit their campaign expenditures, while it
confers significant fundraising benefits upon those privileged
candidates who adhere to the limits. Privileged candidates receive
free broadcast time, 8 as well as sharply reduced broadcast and
84 Id.
" See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996);
Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
86 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976).
87 Id. at 92-93.
88 See S. 25 § 102.
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mailing rates.8 9 Disfavored candidates must pay double promo-
tional costs for the same communications.9
Most significantly, the bill contains triggers which dramatically
raise the spending ceilings and the contribution caps for privileged
candidates whenever disfavored candidates threaten to mount a
serious, well-funded campaign, or whenever independent groups
speak out against a privileged candidate.9'
In effect, the bill tries to insure that privileged candidates will
always be able to counteract the messages of disfavored candidates
and their supporters. The law stacks the deck against the candidate
who will not agree to limits, usually the challenger trying to defeat
an incumbent. In short, this scheme does everything possible to
enable the candidate who agrees to spending limits to overwhelm
the candidate who does not-that is not a level playing field.
It has been widely argued that Buckley§ approval of the
Presidential funding scheme at issue there forecloses constitutional
challenges to the scheme of bills like Senate Bill 25. But that is not
the case. There are three reasons why Buckley does not control the
validity of such provisions.
First, the Court did not address the unconstitutional conditions
issue in Buckley because the argument was not made. The primary
contention was that the Presidential public funding scheme
discriminated against those candidates and parties whom it
excluded,92 not that it exacted unconstitutional conditions and
limitations from those whom it benefitted, nor that it coerced
compliance by penalizing those who declined the offer.93
Second, the Buckley Court did state that Congress could
condition acceptance of public funds on a candidate's agreement to
abide by specified spending limits because a candidate may
89 Id. § 104.
90 Id. § 103(a)(4) (mandating that "the charges for the use of a television
broadcasting station... shall not exceed 50% of the lowest charge and providing
the provision does not apply to noneligible senate candidates").
9' Id. § 101.
92 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94, n.128.
9 The unconstitutional conditions argument was made, but rejected, in
Republican National Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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voluntarily decide to forego private fundraising and accept public
funding. 94 But a candidate or party was free to reject that offer and
try to raise and spend more money than the conditional limits
would permit, without regard to the actions of opposing candidates
or parties. The choice of one candidate did not affect the rights of
others. Whether that conditional funding scheme would survive
close scrutiny under the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is a substantial question.
95
Finally, the scheme in Senate Bill 25 is not just a conditional
funding scheme, requiring candidates to give up rights in order to
get benefits and penalizing non-complying candidates by denying
them free television prime time,96 half-priced purchased time and
discounted mass mailings rates. 97 Senate Bill 25 is also what has
been called a contingent benefits scheme whereby the exercise of
protected campaign spending rights by a noncomplying candidate
triggers statutory fundraising benefits to his or her complying
opponent.9' Thus, if any noncomplying Senate candidate exceeds
the applicable spending limit by only 5%, the complying candi-
date's spending limit is raised tenfold by 50%. Likewise, if a
noncomplying candidate's expenditures exceed 155% of the limit,
the complying candidate's ceiling is again raised tenfold to 200%.
In both instances, the contribution limits for the complying
candidate, but not the noncomplying one, are doubled from $1,000
to $2,000, 9 making it easier for the complying candidate to raise
funds to drown out the noncomplying candidate. Adding insult to
injury, noncomplying candidates are subject to more burdensome
disclosure requirements to enforce the triggering mechanism that
14 Id. at 95.
" See Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364 (1984); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
96 See S. 25 § 102.
97 See id. § 104.
98 See Joseph E. Finley, Comment, The Pitfalls of Contingent Public
Financing in Congressional Campaign Spending Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 735,
738-39 (1995) (defining contingent, public campaign financing). See also Edward
J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment,
39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97, 121-23 (1988) (questioning the validity of
conditional limits on public financing or benefits in campaigns).
'9 See S. 25 § 101.
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raises the spending limits and contribution caps for their complying
opponents. 1
00
The clear purpose and patent effect of this trigger is to chill and
deter, dollar for dollar, any candidate from trying to mount an
effective high-spending campaign. Under this contingent limitation
scheme, incumbents, who will almost always opt for the public
funding, have arranged a way to have their cake and eat it too.
That scheme, which coerces candidates to accept the limitations by
penalizing them if they do not, is a far cry from anything sustained
in Buckley.10'
B. Attacks on PACs
The original McCain-Feingold bill would have totally and
entirely banned all political contributions by political action
committees, 10 2 an unprecedented restriction upon the rights of
100 See id. § 106.
10' Some lower courts have invalidated such one-sided, lopsided "voluntary"
schemes. See Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1426 (8th
Cir. 1995) ("[W]e are hard-pressed to discern how the interests of good
government could possibly be served by campaign expenditure laws that
necessarily have the effect of limiting the quantity of political speech in which
candidates for public office are allowed to engage."), cert. denied, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996); Dayv. Holahan, 34 F.3d
1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
But other courts have upheld contingent arrangements which allowed
favored candidates to be given funding benefits in response to increased funding
and spending activities by non-complying candidates or even independent
campaign groups. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997); Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp.
916 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
The most widely known of such schemes is the so-called "Clean Money"
law in Maine, which gives direct public funds to participating candidates to
counter the messages of non-participating candidates and independent groups
who oppose participating candidates, while allowing independent groups to speak
without limit in favor of participating candidates. A challenge to the Maine
statute was recently dismissed on prematurity grounds, since the full brunt of the
new law does not take effect until 2000. Dagget v. Devine, 973 F. Supp. 203 (D.
Me. 1997).
102 S. 25 § 201 (1997).
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millions of Americans, most of whom are small donors in the $25
to $100 range, to pool their resources to amplify their voices. Such
small-donor PACs, affiliated with groups running the gamut-from
the National Abortion Rights Action League and the Human Rights
Campaign Fund, on the one hand, to the National Right to Life
Committee and the National Rifle Association, on the other-would
be denied the right to support the candidates of their choice. This
cuts to the heart of the First Amendment's protection of freedom
of political speech and association. The bill would give a perma-
nent political monopoly to political parties and political candidates,
silencing all groups that want to support or oppose those parties
and candidates.
There is not a word in Buckley, or any following case, that
suggests the Court would uphold a total ban on PAC contributions
to federal candidates, stilling all those voices. Nothing in Buckley
sustains such a radical restraint on the right of freedom of speech
and association. Buckley upheld a $5,000 limit on political action
committee contributions to individual federal candidates,' not
the total ban, or zero dollar limit, that Senate Bill 25 would impose
on all Senate campaigns.
That is why there was a fallback provision that would reduce
the PAC contribution ceiling to $1,000 to any candidate, which is
also of very doubtful constitutionality.' 4 In 1976 dollars, that
would be about a $350 ceiling on contributions. It is simply
incredible to believe that the Buckley Court would have upheld that
low a limit on individual or PAC contributions, especially when so
many PACS are small donor PACs where the concern with
corruption is attenuated. In Citizens Against Rent Control v City of
Berkeley,105 the Court, by a vote of 8 to 1, invalidated a $250
limit on personal contributions to local referendum campaigns.
Senate Bill 25's limits would be similarly vulnerable. In any event,
this provision is fatally overbroad because it treats all PACs alike,
even those made up only of small contributors.
103 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1976).
'o See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988); Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Carverv. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
105 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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Likewise, the ban on "bundling" of individual contributions by
organizations would abridge the freedom of association that the
Supreme Court has recognized as a basic constitutional free-
dom.' °6 As the Court has pointedly observed, "the practice of
persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political
process."0 7
Finally, the bill contains an overall cap of 20% on PAC
contributions to any candidate.'08 Not only will this simply make
it harder for candidates to raise funds, but it also will intrude upon
freedom of speech and association and act like yet another
backdoor effort to limit overall campaign expenditures-all in
violation of Buckley core principles. This cap on the amount of
PAC contributions that any candidate could receive operates,
effectively, as a zero dollar limit, total ban upon reaching that limit.
Once any Senate candidate has received PAC contributions totalling
20% of the applicable spending cap, all other groups are barred
from supporting that candidate and effectively silenced.
In Buckley, the Court said that, "[g]iven the important role of
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution
restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the
limitations prevented candidates and political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."'0 9 The
Court found that the contribution limits there survived close
scrutiny, in large part precisely because the Act, though limiting
individual contributions to $1,000, permitted PACs to contribute
five times that amount and provided for a proliferation of PACs to
fill the fundraising gap."0 A total or near-total ban on PAC
contributions would fail the Buckley test.
106 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).
"o Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.
10' See S. 25 § 101.
109 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
'1o Id. at 23, 29-30.
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C. Issue Speech
One central and critical distinction has informed the Supreme
Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. Contributions and
expenditures made by federal candidates, their campaigns or those
who expressly advocate their election or defeat, may be subject to
regulation. All other political and issue advocacy and discussion,
even though it may influence the outcome of an election, may not
be subject to government control. This constitutional Continental
Divide is compelled by the First Amendment and built upon the
concept that only express advocacy of the election or defeat of
specific candidates can be subject to regulation.
It is not that there is an inherent distinction between issue
speech and electoral advocacy On the contrary, as the Buckley
Court recognized:
For the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates
may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues
involving legislative proposals and governmental actions.
Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their
positions on various public issues, but campaigns them-
selves generate issues of public interest."'
But Buckley held that if any mention of a candidate in the context
of an issue-based discussion rendered the speaker or the speech
subject to campaign finance controls, the consequences for the First
Amendment would be intolerable.
Accordingly, while candidate-focused contributions, expendi-
tures and express advocacy may be subject to various restrictions
or regulations, the Court clearly held in Buckley that all speech
which does not in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate is totally free of any permissible
regulation: "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures
that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want
.Id. at 42.
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to promote the candidate and his views.', 1 2 The purpose of this
profound distinction is to keep campaign finance regulations from
overwhelming all political and public speech.
The effect of this distinction has been manifold. The express
advocacy concept defines the notion of soft money-political
funding that is used for party-building, get-out-the-vote activities
and generic advertising (e.g. Vote Democratic)-all activities which
do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of specific federal
candidates. Because it is not used for such express advocacy, it can
be raised from sources that would be restricted in making contribu-
tions or expenditures. It is the express advocacy concept that
separates an illegal corporate expenditure advocating the election
or defeat of a specific candidate from an allowable issue advertise-
ment discussing public and political questions." 3 It is the express
advocacy concept that defines and cabins the concept of indepen-
dent expenditures and determines the permissibility of coordinated
expenditures. It is the express advocacy concept that protects a
myriad of non-partisan, issue-oriented groups, such as the ACLU,
in their right to comment on and criticize the performance of
elected officials without becoming ensnared in the federal campaign
finance laws. 4 It is this critical constitutional distinction which
Senate Bill 25 seeks to blur beyond recognition.
1. Soft Money
The same principles that protect unrestrained advocacy by issue
groups safeguard issue advocacy and activity by political parties.
Soft money is funding that does not support express advocacy of
the election or defeat of federal candidates, even though it may
exert an influence on the outcome of federal elections, in the
broadest sense of that term. It sustains primary political activity
such as get-out-the-vote drives and issue advertising. Sections 211,
212, 213 and 221 of the McCain-Feingold bill would severely
112 Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
1.3 Compare Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), with First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
114 See Buckley, 519 F.2d 821, 832 (1975).
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restrict the sources and use of soft money by political parties and
others organizations. The new sweeping limitations on soft money
contributions to, and disbursements by, political parties and other
organizations, federal, state or local, would expand the reaches of
the FECA into unprecedented new areas, far beyond what any
compelling interest would require. The reach of these proposals is
breathtaking.
In 1996, the Court cast considerable doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of these various provisions. By a 7 to 2 margin, the Court
ruled that even candidate-focused, hard money independent
expenditures by political parties on behalf of their candidates were
fully protected by First Amendment principles and the Buckley
precedents. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
v. Federal Election Commission,"' the Court invalidated the FEC
rule that treated all candidate-focused, independent party expendi-
tures as though they were coordinated with the candidate and,
therefore, subject to limitations. In language powerfully relevant
here, the Court held, "We do not see how a Constitution that grants
to individuals, candidates, and ordinary political committees the
right to make unlimited independent expenditures could deny the
same right to political parties.",116 The case for thorough protec-
tion for soft money is even stronger, since it is used by definition
for voter registration, get-out-the-vote, generic advertising (e.g.
Vote Democratic) and other party-building activities.
Indeed, the unrestricted use of soft money by political parties
and non-party organizations like labor unions has been invited by
Buckley--"[s]o long as persons and groups eschew ... ,,17
authorized by Congress". and enhanced by rulings of the Federal
Election Commission. Equally significant, the role of soft money
was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in the Colorado
Republican case." 9 In this case, despite arguments that unre-
strained soft money contributions were undermining the Act's
115 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
116 Id. at 2317.
117 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
1. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 43 1(8)(A)(i), (B)(xii) (1997) (permitting soft money for
federal elections, voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives).
119 116 S. Ct. at 2309.
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limitations on hard money party funding, the Court squarely
rejected the sweeping claims that soft money spent by political
parties was corrupting the system and had to be stopped. The Court
stated:
We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute
more money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate
($1,000) or to other political committees ($5,000). . . . We
also recognize that FECA permits unregulated soft money
contributions to a party for certain activities, such as
electing candidates for state office ... or for voter registra-
tion and get out the vote drives .... But the opportunity
for corruption posed by these greater opportunities for
contributions is, at best, attenuated. Unregulated soft
money contributions may not be used to influence a federal
campaign, except when used in the limited party-building
activities specifically designated by statute. 2°
Accordingly, S.25's sweeping and convoluted limitations on the
amounts and sources of soft money contributions to political
parties2 and disclosure of soft money disbursements by other
organizations' are not justified by precedent.'23 Disclosure,
rather than limitation, of large soft money contributions to political
parties, but not other organizations, is the more appropriate and less
restrictive remedy.
2. Independent Expenditures
The McCain-Feingold bill also contains a variety of new
restrictions on independent expenditures that improperly intrude
upon the core area of electoral speech and impermissibly invade the
absolutely protected area of issue advocacy.
120 Id. at 2316. When the Court suggested that Congress "might decide to
change the statute's limitations on contributions to political parties," it was
referring to hard money donations, not soft money contributions. Id.
121 See S. 25 §§ 211-213.
122 See id. § 221.
123 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), which
upheld a ban on corporate express advocacy, does not control the issue of soft
money activities by political parties.
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Two basic truths have emerged with crystal clarity from twenty
years of campaign finance decisions. First, independent expendi-
tures for express electoral advocacy by citizen groups about
political candidates lie at the very core of the meaning and purpose
of the First Amendment. Thus, groups and individuals, independent
of any campaign or candidate, may make unlimited expenditures
for express advocacy, subject only to some forms of regulation
such as disclosure and, in some cases, limitations on the amount
and source of funding. Second, issue advocacy by citizen group lies
totally outside the permissible area of any government regula-
tion. " The McCain-Feingold bill assaults both principles.
First, Section 405 of the bill vastly expands the concept of
coordinated expenditures 2 ' such that virtually any person or
group having had even the most casual interaction with a candidate
or a campaign is, therefore, barred from making independent
expenditures. These definitions and limitations embody an imper-
missible kind of "gag order" by association.'26 Thus, these new
rules seem sharply inconsistent with the holding of Colorado
Republican which rejected the validity of a conclusive presumption
of impermissible coordination whenever a party made an expendi-
ture favoring its candidates. 127 Yet, Senate Bill 25 replaces the
rejected automatic conclusion with an all but conclusive factual
presumption of coordination and therefore, limitation. 128
Second, if significant independent expenditures are made in
support of another candidate or against an eligible, privileged
candidate, the spending limits of the latter are raised, making it
easier to counteract the independent speech.12 1
124 See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 78-80
(1976).
125 See S. 25 § 405.
126 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (holding that
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed under the First
Amendment).
127 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1996).
121 S. 25 § 405.
129 Id. § 101.
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Finally, the bill imposes a number of new, expanded and
burdensome disclosure requirements on independent speakers who
would make such expenditures. 3 ° For example, any person or
group that spends more than $1,000 to place a small political
advertisement in the New York Times-and that would be a very
small advertisement-within three weeks of an election, must file
a report with the government within twenty-four hours of when
they arrange for the advertisement, before it ever runs. 3' Failure
to do so can result in civil monetary penalties or injunctive suits by
the Federal Election Commission. 3 2 The application of these
extensive new controls is triggered by any political content the
government might deem express advocacy under the grossly
expanded and patently unconstitutional definition contained in the
bill. "'33 The legislative record is replete with evidence that all of
these restrictions are designed to chill and deter core electoral
advocacy by independent groups.
3. Issue Advocacy
The worst legislative assault on settled First Amendment
principles is the effort in bills, such as Senate Bill 25, to obscure
the bright line test of express advocacy, that has been fashioned
over twenty-five years by the courts to protect the broad range of
issue discussion in America from campaign finance controls.
The Buckley Court could not have been clearer about the need
for that bright line, objective test that focuses solely on the
speaker's words. That test is an integral part of the First Amend-
ment, no less than the actual malice rule of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,'34 in defamation cases or the incitement test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio,'35 in subversive advocacy cases.
130 Id. §§ 106, 241(d).
131 Id. § 241(d)(1)(A).
132 Id. § 303.
133 Id. § 231.
134 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
135 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
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As noted earlier,"3 6 the ACLU's initial encounter with cam-
paign finance laws was to defend against the first attempt to use
them to muzzle that small handful of dissenters who had published
an advertisement in the New York Times criticizing the President.
The government claimed that the advertisement was for the purpose
of influencing the outcome of the 1972 Presidential election. The
government was resoundingly rebuffed, and the courts ruled that
the campaign finance laws could not be used in such an open-ended
fashion to control issue speech. 3 7 Instead, express advocacy
would be the bright dividing line between campaign advocacy and
issue speech. The courts fashioned the express advocacy doctrine
to safeguard issue advocacy from campaign finance controls, even
though such discussion might influence the outcome of an election.
The doctrine provides a hard, bright-line, objective test that protects
political speech and association by focusing solely on the content
of the speaker's words, not the motive in the speaker's mind, the
impact of the speaker's opinions, the proximity to an election or the
phase of the moon. The doctrine marks the boundary of permissible
regulation and frees issue advocacy from any permissible restraint.
Pending legislative proposals assault the understanding of and
weaken the protections for issue advocacy by their unconstitutional
expansion of the definition of express advocacy. This expansive
definition sweeps classic issue speech within the zone of regulation,
in violation of the objective and categorical First Amendment
concept the Court fashioned. Thus, these bills abandon the bright
line test of express advocacy (words which in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, such as Vote for
Smith, Vote Against Jones, Elect, Defeat), a test which the
Supreme Court held mandated by the First Amendment. Instead,
the bills resurrect concepts and language reminiscent of the
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" language struck down by
the Court in Buckley.
136 See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text.
137 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-45, 76-80 (1976); United States v.
Nat'l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1139-42 (2d Cir. 1972); Buckley
v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 832 (D.D.C. 1975); American Civil Liberties Union v.
Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1055-57 (D.D.C 1973) (three-judge court).
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For example, Section 406 of the McCain-Feingold bill would
treat as express advocacy and regulate any communication that
"conveys a message that advocates the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate," or worse, "that a reasonable person
would understand as advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate."' 38 That Section would also treat as express advocacy
a communication made, at any time, that meets the reasonable
person test and "that is made for the purpose of advocating the
election or defeat of the candidate, as shown by 1 or more factors
such as a statement or action by the person making the communica-
tion, the targeting or placement of the communication, or the use
by the person making the communication of polling, demographic,
or other similar data relating to the candidate's campaign or
election."' 39 Publication of "box score" voting records informa-
tion would be allowed only if the "communication... is limited
solely to providing information about the voting record of elected
officials on legislative matters and that a reasonable person would
not understand as advocating the election or defeat of a particular
candidate."'"" This circular definition is not a safe harbor for
issue advocacy regarding elected officials. That is how incumbents
would impede dissemination of information about their voting
records and official actions.
1 41
13 s. 25 § 406(b)(20)(A)(i), (ii), (iii).
139 S. 25 § 406(b)(20)(A)(iii).
140 S. 25 § 406(b)(20)(B).
141 At this writing, a "revised" version of the McCain-Feingold bill was
being offered for consideration. The statutory definition of "express advocacy,"
the term upon which so much of the statutory and constitutional regime depends,
has been revised in a number of ways, but the resulting legislative product is no
less intrusive and disruptive of the rights of issue organizations.
The revised definition is as follows:
(b) DEFINITION OF EXPRESS ADVOCACY.-Section 301 of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 (as amended by
section 212(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(20) EXPRESS ADVOCACY
(A) IN GENERAL.-The term 'express advocacy' means a communi-
cation that advocates the election or defeat of a candidate by-
(i) containing a phrase such as 'vote for,' 're-elect,' 'support,' 'cast
your ballot,' '(name of candidate) for Congress,' '(name of candidate)
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in 1997,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject,' or a campaign slogan or
words that in context can have no reasonable meaning other than to
advocate the election or defeat of 1 or more clearly identified
candidates;
(ii) referring to 1 or more clearly identified candidates in a paid
advertisement that is broadcast by a radio broadcast station or a
television broadcast station within 60 calendar days preceding the date
of an election of the candidate and that appears in the State in which
the election is occurring, except that with respect to a candidate for the
office of Vice President or President, the time period is within 60
calendar days preceding the date of a general election; or
(iii) expressing unmistakable and unambiguous support for or
opposition to 1 or more clearly identified candidates when taken as a
whole and with limited reference to external events, such as proximity
to an election.
(B) VOTING RECORD AND VOTING GUIDE EXCEPTION.-The
term 'express advocacy' does not include a printed communication
that-
(i) presents information in an educational manner solely about the
voting record or position on a campaign issue of 2 or more candidates;
(ii) that is not made in coordination with a candidate, political party,
or agent of the candidate or party; or a candidate's agent or a person
who is coordinating with a candidate or a candidate's agent;
(iii) does not contain a phrase such as 'vote for,' 're-elect,' 'support,'
'cast your ballot for,' '(name of candidate) for Congress,' '(name of
candidate) in 1997,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject,' or a campaign
slogan or words that in context can have no reasonable meaning other
than to urge the election or defeat of 1 or more clearly identified
candidates."
The bill contains other unprecedented provisions which also seek to expand
the definition of regulatable political activity beyond where the law has currently
allowed. For example, it creates a new concept and regulates a new category of
something called "federal election activity." "Federal election activity" is defined
as follows:
"(2) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-The term 'Federal election activity' means-
(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins on the date
that is 120 days before the date a regularly scheduled Federal election
is held and ends on the date of the election;
(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign
activity conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate
for Federal office appears on the ballot (regardless of whether a
candidate for State or local office also appears on the ballot); and
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Such provisions attacking issue advertisements and legislative
advocacy, would sweep in the essential issue discussion that
Buckley and preceding cases'42 have held immune from govern-
ment regulation and control. It seems aimed exactly against the
kind of voting record, box score discussion that emanates from the
hundreds of thousands of issue organizations that enrich our public
and political lives. In Buckley, the Court adopted the bright line test
of express advocacy in order to immunize issue advocacy from
regulation: So long as persons or groups eschew expenditures that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
(iii) a communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local
office is also mentioned or identified) and is made for the purpose of
influencing a Federal election (regardless of whether the communica-
tion is express advocacy).
(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.-The term 'Federal election activity'
does not include an amount expended or disbursed by a State, district,
or local committee of a political party for-
(i) campaign activity conducted solely on behalf of a clearly identified
candidate for State or local office, provided the campaign activity is
not a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A);
(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office, provided the
contribution is not designated or used to pay for a Federal election
activity described in subparagraph (A);
(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political convention;
(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, including buttons,
bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict only a candidate
for State or local office;
(v) the non-Federal share of a State, district, or local party committee's
administrative and overhead expenses (but not including the compensa-
tion in any month of an individual who spends more than 20 percent
of the individual's time on Federal election activity) as determined by
a regulation promulgated by the Commission to determine the non-
Federal share of a State, district, or local party committee's administra-
tive and overhead expenses; and
(vi) the cost of constructing or purchasing an office facility or
equipment for a State, district or local committee."
This goes beyond the regulatable areas of campaign contributions and
expenditures and express advocacy and would intrude legislative regulation into
new realms.
42 See, e.g, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want
to promote the candidate and his views. "'
It is significant that the Act at issue in Buckley contained a
similar provision regulating issue-oriented groups because of their
box score and issue advocacy activities. That provision was
unanimously held unconstitutional by the en banc Court of Appeals,
without any further appeal by the government.1" Circuit Judges,
be they liberal or conservative, were unanimous in their condemna-
tion of that effort to control issue speech.
The expanded definitions of express advocacy in Senate Bill 25
and other bills are similarly flawed. They seek to replace that time-
honored concept with the kind of vague and overbroad formulas
that Buckley and other courts have rejected. The circle has turned
full round. Buckley said the First Amendment required that the law
could only regulate "expenditures for communications that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office."' 45 However, the very language and
concepts that the Buckley Court rejected as permissible definitions
for regulatable electoral advocacy have now reappeared in these
bills.
First Amendment rights would turn once again on such vague
and subjective concepts as whether a communication conveys a
message that advocates the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or that a reasonable person would understand as advocat-
ing the election or defeat of a candidate and that is "made for the
purpose of advocating the election or defeat of the candidate as
shown by ... a statement or action by the person making the
communication, the targeting or placement of the communication,
or the use by the person making the communication of polling,
demographic or other similar data relating to the candidate's
campaign or election." '146 Indeed, the prospect of subjecting free
speech rights to the post facto assessment of a reasonable person
test would undo decades of First Amendment jurisprudence
143 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
144 See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 832 (D.C. Cir 1975).
14' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45, 80.
146 See S. 25 § 406.
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designed to protect First Amendment rights against the vagueness
and uncertainty of such a standard.
Some have attempted to defend these suspect provisions by
distorting the meaning of the independent expenditure concept, as
defined by the Court. A communication cannot be defined as an
independent expenditure just because it is designed to affect the
outcome of a federal election,'47 because the speaker's purpose
and effect is to advocate the election or defeat of an identified
candidate 4 ' or because the speaker's predominant intent'49 was
to do so. The courts have rejected these subjective tests as
treacherously dangerous boundary lines to mark First Amendment
rights. '5 Under the First Amendment, an independent expenditure
is only one which expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
specific candidate.' 5 Repeated references to "so-called issue ads"
or "phony issue ads" cannot change that fact. Any bill which would
undo twenty-five years of bright line protection for issue-oriented
speech is fatally flawed.'52
147 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-80.
141 Id. at 43.
149 Id.; see Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
"'0 Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d
1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997); Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309,
1313 (1st Cir. 1997); Federal Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
.' Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 249 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
152 The severe First Amendment problems raised by pending legislative
proposals are compounded and magnified by the inclusion of new enforcement
powers for the Federal Election Commission, which pose unacceptable risks of
prior restraint and political censorship.
With the effort to broaden the reach of the Federal Election Campaign Act,
giving the Federal Election Commission sweeping new powers to go to court to
seek an injunction on the allegation of a "substantial likelihood that a violation
... is about to occur," section 303 of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform
Act of 1997, for example, is fraught with First Amendment peril.
Where sensitivity to the core constitutional protection for issue advocacy is
concerned, the Federal Election Commission has, in the words of one Second
Circuit judge, "failed abysmally." Federal Election Comm'n v. Central Long
Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1980)
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Bills such as McCain-Feingold, which have garnered so much
media support, are precisely the wrong way to seek campaign
finance reform. The limits-based approach has been an utter failure.
True reform would expand political participation and funding,
without limits and conditions; not restrict contributions and
expenditures used by groups and individuals to communicate their
messages to the voters.
But the major legislative proposals look in the opposite,
backward direction. Since twenty-five years of limits have been a
failure, how can more limits remedy the situation? While it is
problematic enough that many would enact legislation based on the
failed strategy of limits, what is even more distressing is the
attempt to embed that failed approach into the fabric of the
Constitution itself.
IV CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE FATAL WAY
Perhaps most distressing of all is the drumbeat of doomsday
rhetoric emanating from press conferences and editorial pages: The
political system is corrupt. Democracy is being destroyed. The
Republic is at risk. Perhaps most symptomatic of this overheated
commentary was the paradoxical comment by House Minority
Leader, Richard Gephardt: "What we have is two important values
in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for healthy
campaigns in a healthy democracy. You can't have both."1 53
Civics and Constitutional Law courses have long taught, however,
that you cannot have one without the other, if not that political
(Kaufman, C.J. concurring). Ever since then, non-partisan, issue-oriented groups
have had to defend themselves against charges that their public advocacy
rendered them subject to all of the FECA's restrictions, regulations and controls.
The kind of "chilling effect" that such enforcement authority generates in the
core area of protected speech makes the strongest case against giving the
Commission additional powers to tamperwith First Amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d
1049 (4th Cir. 1997); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1989);
American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973).
153 143 CONG. REC. S. 2173, 2193 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1997).
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speech was at the core of both our electoral processes and the First
Amendment freedoms. But, our political leaders tell us we have to
choose one or the other, clean elections or free speech. That is
dangerous nonsense.
Likewise, we now have petitions circulated by distinguished
colleagues to overrule Buckley so that its principles will not stand
in the way of reform. Since that is presently doubtful, with seven
of the Justices supporting the basic Buckley framework and
unlikely to reverse course, 154 others have urged the more drastic
step of a constitutional amendment overruling Buckley and allowing
plenary federal and state control of campaign funding. Proposed
amendments are pending in the Congress and well-known political
figures, such as former Senator Bill Bradley, plump for them
whenever possible on talk shows and at podiums across the nation.
So it becomes important to stare into that particular abyss.
What kind of a constitutional landscape would we have if Buckley
were dispatched, either by the Court's own hand or by amendment
of the Constitution?
Whether by interpretation or amendment, a new rule might read
as follows:
Congress shall have power to set reasonable limits on the
amount of contributions that may be accepted by, and the
amount of expenditures that may be made by, in support of, or
in opposition to, a candidate for nomination for election to, or
for election to, Federal office.
The States would be given a comparable power. The above
phrasing of the rule is taken from the text of Senate Resolution
2,155 introduced by Senator Fritz Hollings and co-sponsored by
a number of his colleagues.
Buckley recognized that campaign finance restrictions pose
severe constitutional concerns because they limit the ability of
individuals to advocate candidates and causes in the public forum
'5' See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
' S.J. Res. 2, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997). On March 18, 1997, a vote was held
over the issue to amend the Constitution in order to "reform" campaign finance.




and require government monitoring and control of political speech
activities. 156 In making this assessment, Buckley relied on core
First Amendment principles.
But with Buckley overruled-by decision or amendment-and
the First Amendment principles it embodied in constitutional limbo,
what yardstick would we use to measure campaign finance
restrictions? How will we fare on uncharted constitutional seas
without the principles relied upon in Buckley to guide us?
Our political and constitutional system is predicated on the
necessity of free, uninhibited and robust debate of public issues,
politics and government. Indeed, speech about government and
politics is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-gov-
ernment.1 57 Overturning Buckley would cut to the heart of our
democratic system by empowering Congress or the States to
severely restrict the ability of individuals and groups to communi-
cate their views about candidates or causes if such advocacy were
in any way by, in support of, or in opposition to a candidate for
federal office. By placing the regulation of political funding almost
wholly at the mercy of government, these proposals would turn the
free speech legacy of Holmes, Brandeis, Black, Douglas and
Brennan on its head.
The new regime would grant to Congress the abilities the
Supreme Court held the First Amendment denied: plenary legisla-
tive control over the regulation of campaign finances. 5 8 Since the
common purpose of the proposals is to carve out an exception to
the First Amendment principles announced by the Court, against
what baseline would such legislation limiting contributions and
expenditures be measured? Or would Congress and the states have
largely unfettered discretion to dictate the nature, scope and
enforcement of campaign finance legislation?
Additionally, how would courts measure what were reasonable
limits on contributions or expenditures? Would zero be a reason-
able figure? Could Congress, thereby, completely outlaw any
156 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23.
157 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
... Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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personal campaign expenditures by a candidate and force candi-
dates to rely solely on public funding-at whatever inadequate
level a Congress full of incumbents might deem reasonable?
Challengers and insurgents might have a different view of what is
reasonable; incumbents and major parties write the rules, however.
In 1974, Congress said $70,000-less than the value of the frank
alone-was a reasonable amount to run a Congressional cam-
paign. 159 Would that limit be acceptable today?
Likewise, Congress thought that $1,000 was a reasonable
enough limit on independent citizen political expenditures.'
6°
Thus, it was made a federal crime for anyone to run a small,
one-fourth page advertisement in the New York Times criticizing
the President of the United States and urging people to vote against
him. ' That unprecedented provision effectively suppressed a
primary forum of citizen dissent from government policy. The
ability of citizens, individually or in groups, to publicly criticize
political candidates, government officials and government policy is
one of the mainstays of our democratic system. Under a new
constitutional provision, such core political speech could be
suppressed by totally prohibiting or severely limiting the expendi-
tures required to enable such criticism. It would have outlawed the
anti-Nixon impeachment advertisement that got the ACLU into this
whole issue a quarter century ago. Buckley condemned such a
restriction in unqualified terms as violative of the First Amend-
ment. A decade later the Court reaffirmed that independent political
expenditures are at the core of the First Amendment and cannot be
restricted. 162 The following decade, in 1996, the Court reaffirmed
Buckley and adhered to the same approach. 63 But Buckley is
gone. Would the limit now be reasonable? Under any theory of free
speech-individual self-expression, democratic self-government or
"9 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(E) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
"" Id. § 608(b)(1).
161 See id. § 608(e)(1).
161 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
163 See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
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the market place of ideas-that is a chilling and unacceptable
prospect.
By the same token, Congress could reduce the amount of
allowable political contributions from $1,000 to $500, or even
$100, as suggested in versions of McCain-Feingold, thus effectively
prohibiting all private contributions except for the most modest
expression of support by contributors. By what constitutional
yardstick could such regulation and reduction of the amounts of
campaign funding be measured as "reasonable"?
Just as Congress would be the primary judge of what were
reasonable contribution or expenditure limits, so too, would
Congress decide what communications were in support of, or in
opposition to a federal candidate. Would the anti-Nixon impeach-
ment advertisement now be an expenditure in opposition to
President Nixon and in support of George McGovern? Remember,
that advertisement had not one word of express advocacy,' but
this consideration was not of concern to the government. Presum-
ably, it would also no longer matter under the new First Amend-
ment. Would any public communication, criticizing or praising any
official or individual who happens to be a candidate for political
office, be deemed an expenditure that Congress could limit? With
Buckley eliminated, what would stand in the way of such an
intolerable interpretation?
The reach of the "in support of, or in opposition to" language
is of particular concern to all the non-partisan, issue-oriented
organizations that regularly comment on public policy or inform
their members, or the public, about the voting records of such
4 United Statesv. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1139-
42 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that publication of advertisements by a committee
seeking impeachment of President Nixon did not, by itself, make the committee
a "political entity" where the basic thrust of the advertisement was for the
impeachment of the President and not for specific election campaigns or
candidates); American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041,
1054 (D.D.C. 1973) (three judge court), vacated as moot, Staats v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975) (holding that a requirement that the
media, before accepting advertisements supporting or derogating candidates,
obtain certificates from candidates of no connection, under pain of criminal
penalty, was an impermissible prior restraint that unconstitutionally discouraged
free and open discussion on matters of public concern).
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officials on issues of concern. In the past, the government has
repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to bring such issue
discussion within the reach of campaign finance laws. 65 Indeed,
as has been noted, in 1974, as part of the sweeping campaign
reforms, Congress included a provision explicitly intended to
regulate groups such as Common Cause, the Sierra Club and the
ACLU, because these organizations published box scores rating the
performance of Members of Congress.'66 In Buckley, the lower
court unanimously ruled that the First Amendment prohibited such
government regulation of non-partisan efforts to influence public
opinion.167 Several other courts have reached similar conclu-
sions. '68 The Supreme Court in Buckley, in order to cure the First
Amendment vagueness and overbreadth of statutory terms such as
for the purpose of influencing any election, fashioned the
bright-line distinction between express advocacy, which can be
subject to some campaign finance regulations, and issue advocacy,
which cannot.1 69 Are all of these carefully-crafted distinctions as
dormant as the Buckley case which fashioned and applied them?
Since Buckley is to be overturned, could issue speech now be
systematically regulated or restricted on the ground that contribu-
tions and expenditures for such speech are in support of, or in
opposition to mentioned candidates?
165 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041
(D.D.C. 1973).
166 See 2 U.S.C. § 437a (requiring such groups to report to the commission
if they constitute a political committee). The New York Civil Liberties Union
fell under §437a. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 868-69 (D.C.C. 1975).
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that §437a is unconstitutional because it
restricts completelynon-partisanpublic discussion of issues of public importance.
Id. at 868-78.
167 Buckley, 519 F.2d at 832.
16' Federal Election Comm'n v. Survival Education Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285
(2d Cir. 1995); Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, Federal Election Comm'n v. Keefer, 502 U.S. 820 (1991);
Federal Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately
Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that reporting provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act only apply to partisan discussions that expressly
advocate a particular election result).
169 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
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Lastly, what about the press? May news coverage or editorial
endorsements be considered contributions or expenditures in
support of, or in opposition to favored and disfavored candidates?
Right now, the FECA specifically exempts from the definition of
expenditure "any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper,
magazine or other periodical publication unless such facilities are
owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or
candidate. ... In the past, the government tried to prosecute
the press for publishing editorial endorsements that might influence
the public on election day. 7 ' The Supreme Court held that a
violation of the First Amendment. How would the matter be
decided under a potentially revised First Amendment? Is the press
that different from any other speaker? Buckley was anchored in
numerous free press rulings. With Buckley gone, do those rulings
survive unscathed? Can the press be confident they do? 172
All of these concerns about the reach of campaign finance
restrictions with Buckley eliminated are underscored by the
pervasive problem of enforcement. From the 1972 impeachment
advertisement case to the present time, giving government the
power to regulate expenditures in support of, or in opposition to a
federal candidate invites intensive and disruptive official scrutiny
of all public speech arguably within that zone. In the 1980's, the
Federal Election Commission claimed a whole host of non-partisan
organizations had violated federal campaign law restrictions
because of their criticism of President Reagan's policies. Although
the Commission ultimately dropped these charges, these groups
17' 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1997). See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (ruling that the legislature could give the
media such an exemption from campaign finance controls; but the Court did not
rule that the government had to do so).
,71 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1996).
172 A recent public opinion poll shows that Americans want to restrict
newspapers as much as campaign contributions. And more than 80% of
Americans would like to place restrictions on the way that newspapers cover
political campaigns. See Rasmussen Research, Poll of the Day: Americans Want
to restrict Newspapers as Much as Campaign Contributions, Oct. 24, 1997 (on
file with Journal of Law and Policy).
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were forced to spend considerable time, effort and resources to
defend the right to criticize the President without official examina-
tion or sanction. As Justice Marshall once observed, "the value of
a Sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops."1
73
Under the broad in support of, or in opposition to language, it
is thus possible that individuals, political candidates, political
parties, labor unions, corporations, political action committees,
issue organizations, interest groups and even the media could all be
subject to restrictive regulation of resources used for public and
political advocacy. Ironically, if the ability of these groups and
individuals to use resources to discuss public issues and political
figures is diminished, the relative power of government to shape
and control public opinion will be enhanced. Perhaps this is the
objective.
These possibilities are not far-fetched speculations. They are
the consequences-intended or unintended-of the efforts to
overturn Buckley. The Buckley decision was not a sport. It was
solidly grounded in settled First Amendment principles of freedom
of speech, press, association and self-government. These principles
included (1) that discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution;17 1 (2) that
this reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open"; 75 and (3) that the First Amendment protects political
association as well as political expression.1 76 Moreover, in strik-
ing down limitations on independent expenditures, the Court
primarily relied on two important free press cases.177
The Buckley ruling and the principles it applied have been
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. In 1986, Justice Brennan
confirmed Buckley recognition that "independent expenditures
constitute expression 'at the core of our electoral process and of the
173 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
171 Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
176 Id. at 14-15.
'1 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1996); Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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First Amendment freedoms.'"178 A majority of the Court reached
the same conclusion a decade later.1 9 Without these principles,
and with a new First Amendment, the courts and the country will
be set to sea, in uncharted constitutional waters.
Displacing Buckley by constitutional amendment would also
raise difficult problems of constitutional interpretation, namely how
would a new amendment mesh or interlock with the existing
constitutional provisions and structure. Would it overrule the
specific holding of Buckley on candidate, campaign and indepen-
dent expenditures, but not disturb the underlying First Amendment
principles of speech, press and association upon which the ruling
was based? Could free press or equal protection guarantees still be
used to challenge campaign finance laws, or would the new
amendment preempt those protections as well? If shifting partisan
majorities in Congress decide that the new amendment permits
regulation of election day editorial endorsements by newspapers or
election day exit polls by the networks, can the media still argue
freedom of the press or does the new amendment control? Will
Congress regulate news coverage and reporting? If Congress
provides total campaign subsidies for Democrats and Republicans,
but provides none for independent or third party candidates, can
those excluded from funding claim a denial of equal protection of
the laws; or is such a claim preempted? If Congress allows political
parties to make independent expenditures, but restricts the right of
non-party groups to do so, could this disparity be challenged under
equal protection guarantees or the equality component of the First
Amendment?
Justice Brandeis' classic exposition of free speech was prem-
ised, to a great extent, on principles of individual liberty and
self-development."' 0 May a candidate or independent speaker
178 Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S.
238, 251 (1986) (plurality opinion).
179 Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1996) (stating "the independent expression of
a political party's views is 'core' First Amendment activity no less than is the
independent expression of individuals, candidates, or otherpolitical committees").
"0 Whitney v. California, 254 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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claim that Congressional restrictions on personal campaign
expenditures constitute a deprivation of liberty under the Fifth
Amendment, apart from the now-superseded protections of the First
Amendment?
Americans are not familiar with the notion of a second First
Amendment. There will be great uncertainly about how it meshes
with the first one, as well as with other pertinent constitutional
provisions.
Given these perils and uncertainties, the prudent course would
be to address the problems of campaign finance under the First
Amendment-the traditional First Amendment-and to avoid
creating exceptions to it. Under that First Amendment, the remedy
for bad, excessive, overblown or overly funded speech is "more
speech"-publicly and privately funded-not "silence coerced by
law. , 18
1
V CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAY
It is remarkable that this classic and obvious free speech
remedy-more speech-has all but been ignored in the current
debate. 182 The most effective way to reduce the disparities which
our current campaign finance legal regime has created and to
expand political opportunity without limiting political speech, has
long been known. It is the unitary approach to campaign finance
and the political activity it sustains:
1. No limitations on contributions or expenditures to or by
candidates or causes in the public arena.
2. Full disclosure of large contributions as the effective and
democratic antidote to improper influence by large contributors
over elected officials.
... Id. at 357, 375-77.
12 Some Members of Congress have introduced bills that would embodytwo
of the three '"more speech" approaches to campaign finance reform, namely,
raising contribution limits and making disclosure more effective. See, e.g., H.R.
965, 105th Cong. (1997). But such proposed legislation lacks the third vital
element of a "more speech" strategy: serious public financing of various kinds
to facilitate political candidacy and speech.
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3. Meaningful private and public subsidies and funding of
candidates and campaigns to facilitate political opportunity and
participation.
These are all less drastic remedies than government restriction
of political funding and monitoring of political speech and
association.
These are the pillars of true and real campaign finance reform.
They supply floors without ceilings, encourage and support political
activity without limitation and expand the reach and range of
political discourse without limiting it to the two major parties.
The path out from the morass in which campaign finance laws
have placed us was chartered long ago by the Framers of the First
Amendment; the First Amendment answer to bad, corrupt or
excessive speech is more speech-publicly and privately
funded-rather than silence coerced by law. The following
recommendations would achieve the goal set forth by the framers:
1. Raise individual and committee contribution limits so that
candidates may fund their campaigns with greater ease. The
campaign finance landscape could be vastly improved by simply
raising the low $1,000 ceiling on federal candidate contributions.
2. Give modest tax credits ranging up to $500 for private
political contributions to any party or candidate. Such incentive
would be the most straightforward and participatory form of public
financing of politics-through private choices, publicly amplified.
3. Provide the public with effective and timely disclosure of
large contributions. Additionally, ensure that these disclosures are
made before the election and are widely publicized by the media
and watchdog groups so the electorate will know, prior to the
election, about the fundraising activities of candidates. This
proposal is the most appropriate and democratic remedy to deal
with the problems of undue access and influence on elected
officials. Let the people decide who is too cozy with the fat cats
and the "special interests."
4. Provide a variety of public subsidies and resources to
facilitate campaign activities and reduce the dependence on large
private contributions. This proposal must be accomplished without
allowing unconstitutional strings to be attached. The receipt of
political subsidies or benefits should never be conditioned on the
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
surrender of First Amendment rights. The First Amendment must
not be negotiable.
5. Make public financing available to all legally-qualified
candidates and their causes, not just to Democrats and Republicans.
6. Make public seed money or matching funds available,
without discrimination and unconstitutional conditions attached.
7. Provide free mailing privileges to all legally-qualified federal
candidates. This provision, alone, would help level the playing field
between incumbents and their usually underfunded opponents.
8. Afford candidates free air time, without restrictions or
conditions, to get their message across to the voters.
Each of these approaches has the collateral benefit of allowing
candidates to spend less time raising money and more time raising
issues. Additionally, these strategies have one other thing in
common: they expand political opportunity and political speech
without limitation. They build floors to support political activity
without ceilings that restrict it.
Finally, there is one last factor to be considered: the American
people must rely on their good judgement to cut through big
spending and big giving in order to decide what candidates and
causes deserve their support.
There have always been two basic choices regarding the
solution to the problems of campaign finance. First, the "haves"
may be limited through restrictions and controls. But, this choice
is both unconstitutional and futile. People and organizations with
resources will always find ways to bring their resources to bear on
politics and to communicate their messages to the voters. Restrict
one way and they will find others. As a result, we have a prolifera-
tion of PACs, soft money contributions and issue-oriented groups.
Or you can choose to help the "have nots" by providing the
whole range of subsidies and benefits that expand political
opportunity without restricting free speech.
But in the most important sense, that choice has long ago been
made for the American people. To quote a great political figure,
Senator Eugene McCarthy, one of the challengers in Buckley whom
Judge Winter and I had the honor of representing: "The best
campaign reform law ever written was the First Amendment."
What we should do, then, is not repeal or restrict it, but honor it.
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